Boer History1868 in South Africa: Wodehouse, Brand, Moshesh, and Pretorius
Wodehouse, the Epidemic into January, and Several Gems — Colony 1868
Sir Philip Wodehouse still governed the Cape Colony and still held Her Majesty’s high commission in South Africa. He had arrived at Capetown on the 15th of January 1862. The Table Bay dock voted in the session of 1861 was still unfinished inside John Coode’s plan. The Port Elizabeth light still showed from the 1st of June 1861; the Roman rock light from the 16th of September 1861. Ichaboe, with Holland’s Bird and the other west-coast islets, still stood on the colonial roll from the 16th of July 1866. The census of 1865 had counted 200000 in the Colony. A drought of several years still depressed agriculture and trade. The castle year mattered because the same high commissioner who had pointed the Warden line at Aliwal North on the 28th of October 1864 now held a letter from Buckingham dated the 9th of December 1867, authorising him to treat with Moshesh for the recognition of the Basuto as British subjects, and because a governor who still sat at Capetown would, in March, proclaim that tribe and its country British. [3]
The epidemic that had opened in July 1867 ran into this January. In the seven months from that July there were about 5000 cases, and within 36 weeks 1493 deaths were counted. The outbreak did not look like ordinary measles. The count mattered because a colony already thinned by drought now closed its sick-list in January while the high commissioner still had to write to John Henry Brand and to Moshesh, and because the same towns that buried 1493 in 36 weeks would, in March, hear that the Basuto had been taken as British subjects. [4]
In the forfeited Tembu territory that had received the name of Queenstown, farms held under military tenure since 1853 were in this year released by an act from those obligations, on the ground that such burdensome conditions were no longer necessary. From that date land in this and in the other frontier divisions was held under the ordinary quitrent tenure of the colony. The act mattered because Queenstown, laid out after the war of 1850–53 as a defended village with streets radiating from a Hexagon, now sat on the same quitrent as the older districts, and because a frontier that had been settled as a military belt was no longer held under those burdens. [3]
Search after Schalk van Niekerk’s pebble of 21 carats, sold to Wodehouse for 500 pounds, had found a second diamond in the Hopetown district and a third on the bank of the Vaal. During this year several gems were found. Belief in mines so close at hand was not yet widespread: most people still held that the stones had been accidentally lost, or that ostriches had brought them from some far interior. The several gems mattered because Hopetown and the Vaal bank were now named as diamond ground, even while drought still lay on the gardens and the rush that would follow still belonged to later calendars. [3]
Tandjesberg of the 28th of January, Poshuli, and the Kieme of the 22nd of February — Orange Free State 1868
John Henry Brand still sat at Bloemfontein. The treaty of Thaba Bosigo of the 3rd of April 1866 had ceded a belt of Basuto ground to the Orange Free State. Moshesh had set his mark to that treaty, then failed to clear the ceded land. Chief-Commandant Pansegrouw had taken Makwai’s mountain on the 25th of September 1867. A garrison had been left on that stronghold, and the commando had gone back to the drudgery of patrolling. Letsie, Moshesh’s eldest son, still held the Kieme, a mountain second only in strength to Thaba Bosigo. Poshuli still held Tandjesberg. Masupha and Molitsane still watched the border, and Chief-Commandant Joubert still marched from one place to another and then back again. The Basuto were still placing a very large part of the ceded territory under cultivation: a commando would hardly leave a valley before swarms of men and women, issuing from the mountains, were engaged in hoeing the ground and planting maize and millet. The patrols mattered because Brand’s war was meant to occupy the land Moshesh had marked in 1866, and because Tandjesberg and the Kieme still stood between Bloemfontein and a finished conquest. [3]
The northern commando had succeeded in depriving the enemy of a large quantity of grain and a considerable number of cattle; it had burnt several towns, and destroyed extensive fortifications at Platberg, the Berea, Koranaberg, and other places. The southern commando had met with like success in the districts along the Orange and about the Koesberg. On the 28th of January Tandjesberg was taken by storm by Pansegrouw. The stronghold was attacked in the same way as Makwai’s mountain. Commandant Van der Merwe, with the Fauresmith burghers, was sent to make a feint at the north-eastern point, while Commandant Jooste, with a strong detachment, crept up the south-western extremity. An hour before daybreak Van der Merwe, under a heavy fire of cannon, pretended to storm the mountain, his burghers keeping up a continual discharge of rifles, but not exposing themselves unnecessarily. The ruse succeeded. Poshuli’s men were drawn towards the threatened point, and Jooste seized the opportunity to climb up to the top of the great mound. The rocks there were full of sconces, the first of which was in possession of the burghers before the enemy was aware of what was taking place. Even then the position would have been impregnable if they had not lost heart. In some places the burghers had to scale steep rocks to attack the sconces, but in their enthusiasm they surmounted every obstacle, and early in the morning they were in full possession of the stronghold, from which the Basuto fled in a panic. Though only 6 burghers were wounded, the conquerors counted 126 dead bodies of their enemies. The movable spoil consisted of 106 horses, 140 head of horned cattle, 1070 sheep, and a very large quantity of grain. The 28th of January mattered because Tandjesberg, held by Moshesh’s brother, fell three days before Brand answered Wodehouse, and because a feint at dawn had opened a mountain that looked impregnable. [3]
Among those who fell at Tandjesberg was Moshesh’s brother Poshuli, the most renowned robber captain on that border. He was wounded in the leg, and was endeavouring to get away with the assistance of one of his sons and two or three of his councillors, when he found himself exposed to a fire of musketry from the front. To lighten himself he unbuckled his ammunition pouch and gave it with his rifle to his son. The party then tried to escape into the gorge leading down the mountain, but they had only proceeded a few yards when a ball entered between Poshuli’s shoulders and passed through his chest, killing him instantly. His son and councillors managed to conceal the body in a cave until nightfall, when they carried it away for burial. In the engagement one of the inferior half-brothers of Moshesh also fell, and two of Poshuli’s sons were wounded. The loss of Tandjesberg was considered by the Basuto the severest blow they had received since the formation of the tribe by Moshesh. From its fall the cry of the old chief to the high commissioner was earnest and unceasing, to come quickly or it would be too late. The burghers were in a corresponding degree inspirited. The young corn was now so far grown that it could be easily destroyed, and they were doing their utmost to cut it down. Poshuli’s death mattered because Moshesh’s most famous border captain was gone, and because the old chief’s cry to Wodehouse now ran that delay would leave no tribe to save. [3]
On the 22nd of February another great success was achieved by Pansegrouw’s brigade. Before daylight that morning the same tactics that had been successful at Makwai’s mountain and Tandjesberg were employed against the Kieme, the stronghold of Letsie. Pansegrouw himself, with 100 burghers, made the feint on this occasion. Letsie was at the time on a visit to Thaba Bosigo, and Lerothodi, his eldest son, was in command of the garrison. The Basuto collected to resist the supposed attack, when Commandant Jooste, with 480 burghers and 80 European volunteers, scaled the mountain in another direction. Most of the sconces were taken, but several of the strongest were left unattacked, as they were so situated that to storm them would cost a great loss of life, without any advantage. The Basuto in them were practically shut up, and in course of time would be obliged to surrender. One burgher was wounded, and some 30 Basuto were killed. The spoil taken consisted of 720 horses, 7636 head of horned cattle, 14400 sheep, one cannon, and a quantity of grain. For some time now the Basuto had only been kept together by the encouragement given by Wodehouse, who was anxious to prevent them from crowding into the colony in a state of destitution. When intelligence of the capture of the Kieme reached Capetown, the high commissioner recognised that if the tribe was to be preserved intact no time must be lost in placing it under British protection. The 22nd of February mattered because Letsie’s mountain fell while he sat at Thaba Bosigo, and because the spoil — 7636 cattle and 14400 sheep — told Capetown that the tribe could not wait for a visit in April. [3]
Wodehouse of the 13th of January, Brand of the 31st, and the Proclamation of the 12th of March — 1868
Buckingham’s letter of the 9th of December 1867 had authorised Wodehouse, whenever a fitting opportunity might occur, to treat with Moshesh for the recognition of himself and his tribe as British subjects, and for the incorporation of their territory with Natal, and had impressed upon him the importance of including a settlement of the boundaries between the Free State and Basutoland as an integral part of the arrangement. As soon as that despatch reached South Africa, the high commissioner communicated with Brand and Moshesh — the 13th of January — informing them of the power placed in his hands, and announcing that he intended to make use of it. To each he recommended a suspension of hostilities, and stated that he would visit the Lesuto about the end of March or beginning of April to make the necessary arrangements. The reply of Moshesh was full of thanks and protestations of loyalty. The 13th of January mattered because London’s leave of December now sat on Brand’s table at Bloemfontein, and because a high commissioner who recommended a pause was telling both sides that he meant to take the Basuto. [3]
The president, in his answer dated the 31st of January, after recapitulating the events that led to the war, informed the high commissioner that he thought it would be unsafe to suspend hostilities against the Basuto at the moment that the object of the war was nearly accomplished, and when the arms of the Republic were, under God’s blessing, everywhere successful, trusting merely to the good faith and the inclination and power of Moshesh to make his people comply with the treaty of Thaba Bosigo. He had therefore written to Moshesh that the war would be prosecuted with vigour until the murderers of Bush and Krynauw were delivered to the Free State, and the annexed territory cleared of the Basuto. As the second article of the convention of the 23rd of February 1854 stated that Her Majesty’s Government had no wish or intention to enter thereafter into any treaties to the north of the Orange river which might be injurious or prejudicial to the interests of the Free State, the communication that Moshesh and his tribe were in all probability about to become subjects of the British crown had taken him quite by surprise. He regretted that he could not coincide in his Excellency’s opinion that the course proposed would tend to the future general peace of South Africa. And as the interest and welfare of the Free State would be so seriously affected by it, he had convened the volksraad to meet in extraordinary session on the 21st of March. The president’s statement of the recent successes of the Free State arms was correct: the letter was dated only three days after Tandjesberg had been taken. The 31st of January mattered because Brand would not pause on the strength of Moshesh’s word, and because he read the Bloemfontein convention of 1854 as a bar to a British treaty north of the Orange. [3]
Wodehouse, on finding that Brand’s government did not cease hostilities, issued directions that no ammunition should be permitted to be removed from any of the colonial ports to the Free State without his authority. But, while acting in this decided manner, his language to the president was more friendly and conciliatory than it had ever been before. He pointed out that if a fair understanding could be arrived at, the British authorities would be bound to maintain a due control over their own subjects, and the people of the Free State would thus be left to enjoy in peace, and without any extraordinary effort on their part, the lands they had hitherto held on such unprofitable terms. He was seeking, he said, the welfare of the Free State quite as much as that of the Basuto. He could not forget that its people were all but a few years before, as many of them still were, British subjects; that they were the near kinsmen of the people of the Cape Colony; and that any misfortunes that befell them must to a great extent be shared by the colonists. He therefore still allowed himself to hope that he might gain the assent of the Free State Government to his proposals, and that by consenting to suspend hostilities with a view to negotiation, that government would prevent further unnecessary sacrifice of human life. The stop on ammunition mattered because a high commissioner who could not halt Brand’s commandos could still close the colonial ports against their powder, and because the same letter that closed the ports still asked Bloemfontein to treat. [3]
Accordingly Sir Walter Currie, commandant of the frontier armed and mounted police, was directed to mass as many of his men as possible on the border, and as soon as that could be done a proclamation was issued by Wodehouse. Whereas, with a view to the restoration of peace and the future maintenance of tranquillity and good government on the north-eastern border of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Her Majesty the Queen had been graciously pleased to comply with the request made by Moshesh, the paramount chief, and other headmen of the tribe of the Basuto, that the said tribe might be admitted into the allegiance of Her Majesty; and whereas Her Majesty had been further pleased to authorise him to take the necessary steps for giving effect to her pleasure in the matter: now, therefore, he did hereby proclaim and declare that from and after the publication hereof the said tribe of the Basuto should be, and should be taken to be, for all intents and purposes, British subjects; and the territory of the said tribe should be, and should be taken to be, British territory. The proclamation by which the Basuto became British subjects and their country British territory was dated on the 12th of March, and was published on the following day. It was received by the majority of Europeans in South Africa with great disfavour, for there was almost universal sympathy with the Free State. Many even regarded the interference of the high commissioner as a wrong, which sooner or later would surely be followed by retribution. There could be no permanent peace, it was asserted, until the Basuto tribe was reduced to submission. The little Free State, whose total white population was only 37000 souls, had nearly succeeded in doing that which Great Britain herself had failed to accomplish, and just when victory was certain its fruits were snatched away by the hand that ought to have been most friendly. Language such as this was not confined to Dutch-speaking people; many men of English descent expressed themselves with equal feeling on the subject. On the other hand, a small section of the community, confined almost exclusively to men engaged in commerce, maintained that the act of Wodehouse was necessary in the general interests of the country, and was by no means an unfriendly one towards the Free State. It was pointed out that Thaba Bosigo was not yet taken, and it was argued that the Basuto tribe, even if conquered, could not be kept in control by its exhausted opponent. The ordinary revenue of the Free State was only 56000 pounds per annum, its ordinary expenditure was 55000, and its public debt was 50000 pounds to the Bloemfontein Bank, 39000 still in circulation in notes out of the issue of 43000, and outstanding accounts amounting to 16000: in all 105000 pounds. There were government notes to the amount of 126000 pounds in circulation, and 5 pounds in notes had only the purchasing power of 3 pounds in gold. The imports during the war were at the rate of 300000 pounds yearly, and the exports only at the rate of 265000, thus leaving a balance of trade against the state of 35000 pounds per annum. No less a sum than 650000 pounds was due by traders and farmers of the state to the Standard Bank, merchants of Port Elizabeth, and others in the Cape Colony, while the civil courts were closed on account of the war. To all these figures the reply was that the Free State did not admit that it was exhausted, it was prepared to continue to the end a struggle which it had nearly brought to a successful conclusion, and would take good care to make such terms as would prevent the Basuto from again breaking the peace. The proclamation laid down no limits for the Lesuto, nor did it define clearly what people were annexed. The followers of Moperi, living in Witsi’s Hoek, were unquestionably Basuto. So were the clans under Molapo, living between the Putiatsana and the Caledon, and the adherents of Jan Letele, living in the district of Smithfield. All these were Free State subjects, but they might, or might not, be included in the proclamation, just as one should interpret it. The 12th of March mattered because Moshesh’s tribe became British subjects while Brand’s commandos still held the ceded belt, and because a paper that named no line left Molapo, Moperi, and Letele in dispute. [3]
Currie of the 14th of March, the Volksraad of the 24th, and Thaba Bosigo of the 15th of April — 1868
On the 14th a commission was issued to Currie appointing him agent for the high commissioner in Basutoland. He was instructed to lose no time in proceeding to the assistance of the Basuto with the whole available police force, which had been assembled for that purpose in the Wittebergen reserve. At the same time the high commissioner wrote to Moshesh and to Brand, informing them of the proclamation. To the president he added that he entertained the strongest desire of communicating unreservedly, with a view to the satisfactory settlement of affairs. On the 23rd of March Currie, with the police, crossed the Orange and entered the Lesuto. He was desirous of proceeding at once to Thaba Bosigo, but was unable to get guides or assistance of any kind, as the people of that part of the country were ignorant of the negotiations between the high commissioner and Moshesh, and were suspicious of the police. Currie therefore called upon Austen, superintendent of the reserve, for assistance. That officer at once repaired to the camp, and sent out messengers in all directions with intelligence that the police had come to assist the Basuto. He also engaged a son of Morosi and 10 men from the reserve to accompany the commandant to Thaba Bosigo. On the 26th Currie arrived at Moshesh’s headquarters and was received with every demonstration of joy by the old chief and the people about him. Upon the proclamation being read they all rose up and gave three cheers for the Queen, Moshesh himself being greatly excited. A notification was immediately sent by the high commissioner’s agent to the various commandants of the Free State forces in the field, informing them that he had directed the chiefs to cease all aggressive movements, and that it would be his duty to assist and support the Basuto if hostilities should be continued against them. He then formed a camp at Korokoro, about 10 miles south of Thaba Bosigo, and 3 miles east of the Kieme, where he awaited the course of events. The 23rd of March mattered because colonial police now stood on Moshesh’s ground, and because three cheers for the Queen at Thaba Bosigo on the 26th told Brand’s commandants that a British agent would support the tribe if the war went on. [3]
As soon as Brand received notice of the proclamation he issued instructions to the officers of the Free State forces under no circumstances to cross the boundary fixed by the treaty of Thaba Bosigo. They were to remain within the ceded territory and guard it against encroachments by the Basuto, and should British troops or the colonial police appear there, they were to protest formally, but to offer no resistance. On the 21st of March the volksraad met, when a long and earnest discussion took place upon the high commissioner’s proceedings. The views entertained by the members were that the Free State had been unjustly and ungenerously dealt with. Unjustly, inasmuch as the convention of 1854 had been violated by the reception of the Basuto as British subjects, and by the prohibition of the sale of ammunition to the Republic by merchants in the colony. Ungenerously, inasmuch as the little state, which had been thrown upon its own resources by England owing solely to the difficulty of dealing with the Basuto, had made enormous sacrifices to punish the disturber of the peace of South Africa, and was therefore entitled to the sympathy of Her Majesty’s Government. Holding such views, on the 24th of March the volksraad directed the president to protest to the Imperial Government in the most positive and emphatic manner against the recent acts of the high commissioner, and to inform his Excellency that they could not appoint delegates to enter into any negotiations based upon a violation of the convention of 1854. It was resolved to send a deputation to England to confer directly with the Imperial Government. The 24th of March mattered because Bloemfontein would not treat on a paper that took the Basuto, and because a deputation to London was the Free State’s answer to a high commissioner already on the road. [3]
Meantime the high commissioner had left Capetown to visit the Lesuto. On the 27th of March he was at Colesberg, from which place he addressed a letter to Brand proposing terms of settlement. These terms were that the boundary of Basutoland should be that fixed by Grey in 1858, and by himself in 1864; that along the Basuto side of the line he would cause 300 farms of 1500 morgen each to be sold, and pay the proceeds to the Free State Government; or that he would grant titles on quit-rent to nominees of the Free State Government for the same number of farms. This proposal, if accepted, would thus have placed a belt of Europeans under English rule between the Free State and the portion of the Lesuto reserved for the natives, would have taken from the Free State the whole of the land ceded to it by the treaty of Thaba Bosigo — inclusive of the district occupied by Molapo — would have restored four-sevenths of that land to the Basuto, and would have given to the Free State in return the proceeds of the sale of 300 farms. The president declined the proposal. He replied that, apart from all other considerations, many grants of farms had been made in the ceded district; land had been sold, resold, and transferred in it; part of it was pledged as security for money borrowed by the state; and sites for villages had been surveyed in it, the erven of one of which — Wepener, close to Jammerberg Drift on the Caledon — had been allotted in October 1867; so that the Free State Government would be laying itself open to endless claims and complications by acceding to the proposal. He desired instead that the high commissioner would restrain the Basuto within the boundary fixed by the treaty of Thaba Bosigo, until the result of the protest about to be forwarded to the Imperial Government should be known. Colesberg on the 27th of March mattered because Wodehouse offered Brand the Grey–Wodehouse line and 300 farms of 1500 morgen, and because Brand would not give back land already sold, pledged, and laid out as Wepener. [3]
On the 30th of March the high commissioner reached Aliwal North. From this place he addressed the president, calling his attention to the fact that the courts of the Free State had been closed for the hearing of civil cases during the continuance of the war, and maintaining that this was a violation of the convention. He asserted further that the employment of British subjects under the conditions offered by the Free State was an unfriendly act, and tended to set at naught the neutrality proclamation. The president replied, explaining that the civil courts were necessarily closed while the burghers were in the field, and citing precedents in the recent history of the Cape Colony. He claimed that the Free State had respected the neutrality proclamation, and denied that the employment of English residents, who offered their services in war, was unfriendly towards the British Government. He offered to guarantee that no molestation should be made across the boundary according to the treaty of Thaba Bosigo, if his Excellency would do the same from the other side. The high commissioner answered that he would be unable to restrain the Basuto within these limits, as the country left to them by the treaty was too small for their maintenance. He then withdrew his former offer, but professed himself still willing to enter into negotiations. In a subsequent letter, written at the police camp at Korokoro on the 14th of April, he proposed that, pending the negotiations with Her Majesty’s Government, a temporary boundary should be agreed upon, and molestation from either side prohibited. For this purpose he proposed the line which is the boundary between the Orange and the Caledon, and across the last named river a line which would restore to the Basuto a triangular block of ground of no very great extent, but which contained the French mission stations of Mekuatling and Mabolela. This proposal contained no reference to Molapo by name, but, if accepted, it would have deprived the Free State of its claim to authority over him and his clan. The president, however, declined to agree to it. Aliwal North and Korokoro mattered because Wodehouse would not hold the Basuto inside the Thaba Bosigo line, and because Brand would not take a temporary Caledon line that quietly took Molapo. [3]
On the 15th of April a great meeting took place at Thaba Bosigo. With Wodehouse were Keate, lieutenant-governor of Natal, Shepstone, secretary for native affairs in Natal, Currie, and several other officers and attendants. The reverend Mr Daniel, who had accompanied the high commissioner from Aliwal North, acted as interpreter. The old chief Moshesh was there with his sons, councillors, and most of the leading men of the tribe, all deeply anxious to learn what the great power whose aid they had invoked intended to do for them. The high commissioner stated that in order to carry on the government of the country three or four British officers would be appointed, but that the customs of the people would not be interfered with more than was necessary. As soon as negotiations with the Free State were concluded the Lesuto would be annexed to Natal, according to the wish expressed by Moshesh and the instructions of the Imperial Government. The Basuto must not expect to have the whole of the territory within the boundaries of 1858 restored to them, but he would endeavour to recover sufficient ground for their comfortable subsistence outside of the limits assigned by the treaty of Thaba Bosigo. They must be prepared to pay annually a tax of 10 shillings for each occupied hut in the country. Their subsequent conduct proves that the high commissioner’s address gave very little real satisfaction to the Basuto chiefs, nevertheless they were profuse in thanks for what he had done and intended to do for them. The hut-tax, they promised, should be regularly paid as soon as peace should be restored. To one point only did they make objection. They did not wish the Lesuto annexed to Natal, for that was a country of which they knew very little, while with the Cape Colony they had been acquainted since the time when Napier was governor. Within a few days letters were written in the name of the chief, asking that the Lesuto might be declared a native reserve — that is, that it should be kept for the use of black people only, and Europeans be prevented from holding land in it; that it might remain distinct from both the Cape Colony and Natal, and be dependent upon the high commissioner alone; but that if it must be joined to one of these colonies the Basuto would prefer the Cape. The high commissioner was also requested to receive Moperi as a British subject, and claim was laid to Witsi’s Hoek, where Moperi lived, as being part of the Lesuto. Nehemiah at the same time wrote asking leave to return to Matatiele, and that a British agent might be appointed to reside there with him. Wodehouse took no notice of the claim to Witsi’s Hoek. He remained in the Lesuto until the 28th of April, but could do nothing towards the pacification of the country. In the ceded territory skirmishing continued as before the issue of the proclamation, though military operations on a large scale were no longer conducted. Trading operations, however, were renewed to some extent. The 15th of April mattered because Moshesh heard that the Lesuto was to go to Natal and to pay 10 shillings a hut, and because the chiefs who thanked him still asked for a native reserve under the high commissioner, or, failing that, the Cape. [3]
Molapo of March, July on the Caledon, and Morija — Lesuto 1868
By this time Wodehouse had made himself acquainted with the actual condition of affairs around him. The war had entailed great losses, and had disorganised society everywhere. The tribe seemed ready to break up into a hundred fragments. There was a great deal of sickness among the people, owing to want of food and shelter by the clans that had been most exposed. It was believed that some of them had resorted again to cannibalism, but Europeans could not then ascertain whether this was correct or not. Four months later the rumour was proved to be true. In July J. H. Bowker was shown a cave, of which he wrote to the high commissioner that the floor and the open space in front were so covered with human bones, chiefly of young people, that he could have loaded a waggon with them in a short time; all of the skulls were broken; and though some of the bones were apparently many years old, others had been cooked quite recently. But though some sections of the tribe were reduced to the direst distress, others had hardly suffered at all. Several of the leading chiefs had lost very little of their personal property. Their cattle were safe in the mountains, and with them there was no scarcity of food. Inside the limits of the Lesuto, according to the treaty of Thaba Bosigo, there were enormous crops of corn ready for gathering, while in the country of Molapo, between the Putiatsana and the Caledon, every valley was a cornfield. The police were purchasing then, as they did for many months afterwards, as much millet as they needed at 12 shillings a muid. The condition of the Lesuto mattered because a proclamation had taken a tribe that was splitting, and because a cave of bones in July sat beside Molapo’s valleys, where millet still sold at 12 shillings a muid. [3]
Molapo, so far from being a contented and peaceable subject of the Free State, as the president at an earlier date supposed, had welcomed the high commissioner’s agent and expressed a desire to come under British protection. He had informed Currie that the reason why he had taken no part in the recent hostilities was an understanding between his father and himself that his people should merely pretend to be peaceful, so as to grow abundance of food and protect the cattle of the tribe; but they had intended to join their kinsmen against the Free State whenever it could be done with a prospect of success. He had brought a present of cattle for the use of the police, had written to the president throwing off his allegiance, and had set at defiance the Free State commandant who resided with him. Moperi had also communicated with the high commissioner’s agent, and had expressed a wish to be reunited to the remainder of the tribe and be taken under British protection. But he was unwilling to give up his location in Witsi’s Hoek and return to the Lesuto. In the territory ceded by the treaty of Thaba Bosigo, the Free State forces held most of the strong places, but had not succeeded in entirely expelling the Basuto. These, however, had no powder left, and did not venture to meet their opponents in the open field. Molapo’s welcome mattered because a Free State subject between the Putiatsana and the Caledon now threw off Brand, and because Moperi wanted British protection without leaving Witsi’s Hoek. [3]
As soon as the high commissioner left, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself, resting on the disappointment of the chiefs that the boundaries of 1858 had not been restored, and that peace had not been the immediate result of their adoption as British subjects. At this juncture Currie was replaced as high commissioner’s agent by Bowker, the officer next in rank in the frontier police, and the greater number of the police were withdrawn from the Lesuto and returned to their duties on the colonial border. The protest of the Free State against the reception of the Basuto as British subjects and against the stoppage of ammunition was submitted to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, who referred it to Buckingham on the ground that it was not expedient to deal with the Republics in South Africa through the foreign office. The Free State delegates — the reverend Mr Van de Wall and C. J. de Villiers — were received by Buckingham at the colonial office. They first requested that the proclamation of Wodehouse should be withdrawn, and the Free State be left alone to make terms with the Basuto. This was refused, and they then asked that an impartial commission should be sent from England to examine the case on the spot. This also was declined, and the delegates were informed that the Queen’s Government would not withdraw the negotiations from the high commissioner, and would only correspond with the president through him. Buckingham left the matter entirely to the high commissioner, agreed to the scheme which he advocated of governing the country for a time by an agent without annexation to either colony, and extended Wodehouse’s term of office to enable him to bring the affair to a conclusion. All this time a lengthy correspondence was being carried on between the high commissioner and the president of the Free State, but without any result. The London mission mattered because Van de Wall and De Villiers could not get the proclamation withdrawn, and because Buckingham left the Lesuto in Wodehouse’s hands, to be governed for a time by an agent without annexation. [3]
Ramanela, ever a prime mover in deeds of violence, had continued depredations upon the Free State farmers, without any regard for the high commissioner’s proclamation and subsequent instructions. Molapo offered to chastise him, but Brand would not consent to his doing so while he remained a Free State subject. Bowker, however, authorised Molapo to punish the robber, which he did by falling upon him, and seizing about 1000 head of cattle. At the end of July the country on the Free State side of the Caledon was still as fully occupied by Basuto as it had been in March. Molitsane himself had moved to Makwai’s old kraal, but his sons were still in the Koranaberg. Parties of Basuto were even crossing from their own side and settling on the other. The frontier police, under Bowker in the Lesuto, had been reduced to 36 men. With the establishment of British authority in the Lesuto the French missionaries returned to their labours. The territory retaken by Wodehouse from the Free State contained all their lost stations except four. At once they set about reorganising their work, establishing new church centres and opening new schools. Prior to this date the children in their schools had received instruction in no other language than their own. Though there were more than 3000 individuals in the country who could read Sesuto, Bowker was unable to obtain a single native interpreter, the few petty chiefs who understood English being considered untrustworthy by him. From this time forward the youths in the higher classes have been taught English also. In this year a training school for teachers was established at Morija. The government would have assisted with grants of money if there had been any revenue that could be applied to such a purpose. July and Morija mattered because the Caledon was still occupied on the Free State side four months after the proclamation, because Molapo seized about 1000 of Ramanela’s cattle on Bowker’s authority, and because the French stations reopened while 36 police held the Lesuto and Morija began to train teachers in English. [3]
A Thousand of January, Mapela of the 13th of June, and Welgevonden of the 21st of July — South African Republic 1868
Marthinus Wessel Pretorius still sat at Pretoria. Schoemansdal had been left and burned in 1867; Marabastad had taken the landdrost; the northern district still sat in laager. In January Pretorius called out a commando of 1000 men, to assemble on the 20th of February, and announced that if they did not respond to the order the district must be entirely abandoned. About 260 mustered on the day appointed. With these Commandant-General Kruger proceeded to Makapan’s Poort to ascertain the condition of affairs. Mapela still professed to be loyal, but all the petty chiefs in that neighbourhood were in arms. Mapela had a following of at least 5000 warriors, and occupied a position of great natural strength. Kruger was determined that he should take an active part on one side or the other, and therefore called upon him as a vassal of the Republic to furnish a certain number of slaughter oxen for the use of the commando in the field. As anticipated, this obliged the chief to show his true colours, and instead of sending the oxen he declared war. Upon this Kruger sent a report to the president, urging the necessity of proclaiming martial law throughout the Republic, requiring every man who could bear arms to take the field, and obtaining by any sacrifice an adequate supply of munitions of war. As he could do nothing with the little force under his orders, he placed a guard of 60 men at Potgieter’s Rust, and returned to Pretoria to urge the volksraad, which was then in session, to adopt decisive measures. The 20th of February mattered because 260 of 1000 answered the call, and because Kruger forced Mapela to choose a side rather than leave 5000 warriors sitting as pretended friends. [3]
The distress and poverty of the Europeans in the laagers had in the meantime so greatly increased that on the 14th of March the reverend N. J. van Warmelo and R. A. van Nispen — who had succeeded Vercueil as landdrost — published from Marabastad an appeal to charitable persons everywhere to assist in obtaining clothing for the women and children, who were nearly naked. The volksraad debated earnestly on the pecuniary condition of the country. The last issue of notes had been insufficient to meet expenses, and 1230 pounds more had been created than had been authorised. Notwithstanding the stringent laws making the notes a legal tender, their purchasing power was then only 30 per cent. of that of gold; but there was no other resource, and a fresh issue was resolved upon. Paper money to the nominal value of 45000 pounds was created on this occasion, a portion of which was to be used to redeem all previous issues except that of 1867. The public debt, as represented by this paper, was thus increased to 65000 pounds. As security for the whole debt, 1000 farms — equal to 3000000 morgen of land — were set apart, with a proviso that 100 should be sold by public auction every year, with a reserve of 100 pounds on each, and the proceeds be employed to redeem the notes until all were destroyed. By this measure a scanty supply of ammunition was obtained, and at the end of May between 800 and 900 burghers took the field, assisted by a large band of loyal blacks. The 14th of March mattered because Marabastad had to beg clothing for women and children in laager, and because 45000 pounds in notes, worth 30 per cent. of gold, were the Republic’s only means of putting 800 to 900 burghers in the field. [3]
On the 13th of June Kruger attacked Mapela’s mountain, and made himself master of every portion of it except one very strong position on which the chief’s principal kraal was built. In the attack 2 burghers were killed and 11 were wounded, but it was computed that Mapela’s loss was at least 300 warriors killed, besides about 2000 head of horned cattle, 300 sheep and goats, and 12 guns seized by Kruger’s commando. Two days later another attack was made upon the stronghold, and the kraal was partly burnt, but was not wholly occupied or destroyed. A number of women and children were made prisoners, and were detained in order to bring the insurgents to terms. At this juncture intelligence was received from the north that an old feud had broken out between the most powerful of the clans in the Zoutpansberg range, that they were fighting with each other, and that Umzila, chief of the great Matshangana tribe, was preparing to attack them all. The burghers on commando could wish for nothing better. Their supply of ammunition was already beginning to run short, so after an attack upon Matshem, a chief who was assisting Mapela, and some skirmishing with other clans in the neighbourhood of Makapan’s Poort, in which hardly any damage was done, they dispersed to their homes. The 13th of June mattered because Kruger took the mountain except the principal kraal, and because a feud in the range and a short powder-horn sent the commando home before Mapela was wholly beaten. [3]
In July Pretorius visited Zoutpansberg. Dissensions were prevailing among the clans in the mountains, and though Umzila had not yet attacked them, many of the captains professed a desire to arrange matters so that they could again live in peace. On the 21st of the month there was a meeting at the farm Welgevonden, when Tabana with his people, the Knobnoses, who had formerly been subject to the superintendent Albasini, the adherents of Buys, and some others had a conference with the president and the landdrost Van Nispen. The president announced that Stephanus Schoeman had been appointed diplomatic agent in the district, and that Albasini was no longer in the service of the government. At this they expressed much gratification, and promised to be obedient to Schoeman. Messages expressing a desire for peace and offering to pay tribute again were received from several of the mountain chiefs, and friendly replies were returned. Several of the chiefs then visited Pretorius, when assurances of friendship were exchanged. The president left Schoeman to conclude the arrangements. By his efforts a condition of comparative tranquillity was restored, which enabled many of the farmers to return to their former homes and resume their occupation of breeding cattle. But the absolute supremacy of the Republican Government over all the clans was by no means re-established, and in several instances farmers thereafter were obliged to pay tribute to the nearest chief to secure their property from plunder. In November, Mapela and his neighbour Matshem sent messengers to Pretoria to request the government to make a formal peace with them similar to that made with the chiefs on the other side of the district. This was not then acceded to. In this year the village of Zeerust was founded as a churchplace, but did not become the seat of a landdrost. Welgevonden on the 21st of July mattered because Schoeman replaced Albasini as agent, and because farmers could go home to breed cattle under a peace that still had to be bought from the nearest chief, while Zeerust was founded as a churchplace without a landdrost. [3]
The 29th of April, Moselekatse of November, and Montsiwa of August — South African Republic 1868
Since the first explorations of the country by Europeans, the mineral wealth of the South African Republic was known to be very great, though not much had yet been done towards developing it. Lead was obtained for home use, but the difficulty and expense of carriage prevented its exportation. Beds of coal extended over the south-eastern districts, and where wood was scarce, coal was used for fuel. Iron existed in vast quantities, and was smelted by the blacks for their own wants. One mountain in the district of Lydenburg was composed of nearly pure iron ore, and affected the magnetic needle at a distance of 10 miles. Common salt was plentiful and easily obtained. Silver, copper, cobalt, sulphur, and saltpetre were also found in various localities, but whether the quantity and quality of these minerals were such as to make their extraction profitable had not yet been determined. A few weeks after Karl Mauch’s announcement of December 1867 parties of gold-seekers began to leave the villages of the Republic, and to pass through them from other parts of South Africa. Exaggerated reports of the value of the discovery reached Australia, and from that country a party of experienced miners arrived at Natal, expecting to find gold-digging an established industry. Some of them were sent to the Tati by a Natal company, others were employed to prospect for gold in that colony. In England the London and Limpopo Mining Company was formed in this year. As soon as the discovery of gold at the Tati was made known, Pretorius sent messengers to Moselekatse and to Matsheng to endeavour to induce those chiefs to become subjects of the Republic. Moselekatse was then residing only about 100 miles north-east of the Tati. Matsheng was chief of the Bamangwato, a tribe of Betshuana living just north of the tropic and not far west of the Limpopo. In neither case was the mission successful. The gold-seekers mattered because Mauch’s Tati of December 1867 now drew Australians through Natal, and because Pretorius tried to bring Moselekatse and Matsheng under Pretoria before he drew a new line on the map. [3]
Without waiting for reports from his messengers, on the 29th of April, the president, with the concurrence of the executive council, issued a proclamation in which the boundaries of the Republic were extended on the west to a straight line from Lake Ngami to the northern point of Langeberg, and on the east were made to include one mile on each side of the rivers Pongolo and Usutu or Maputa down to the sea. On the north a great extent of country was added to the Republic, but not the district occupied by Moselekatse. As soon as this proclamation reached Capetown, Wodehouse wrote objecting to the inclusion in the Republic of so much territory previously occupied by independent native tribes; and Chevalier Duprat, consul-general for Portugal in South Africa, wrote that a portion of the land annexed on the east coast had been since 1546 in possession of the kingdom he represented. The objections raised by Wodehouse and Duprat caused the government to recede to a great extent from the claims it had made. The question of the western boundary was left over; the boundary on the east was arranged without difficulty in the correspondence that followed, though the treaty that would close it was not yet signed. That this question of their western boundary had been under the notice of the British authorities in South Africa, when the conventions of 1852 and 1854 were signed, was unknown to the burghers of the South African Republic in this year; but they were of course aware that a claim had always been made to the territory as far west as it was habitable, based on the conquest of the Matabele. The 29th of April mattered because Pretorius drew a line from Ngami to Langeberg and down the Pongolo to the sea without waiting for Moselekatse, and because Wodehouse and Duprat forced Pretoria to recede before the year closed. [3]
In November intelligence reached Pretoria that the old chief Moselekatse was dead. This event caused the government to cast a watchful eye towards the north, as it might be followed by serious disturbances. The recognised heir of the deceased chief had disappeared many years before, and it was not certain whether he was still alive or not. Confidential persons were sent by the indunas to look for him, and in Natal a man was found who declared that he was Kuruman, the person being sought for. But upon his being closely examined, most of the indunas and old people expressed an opinion that he was not Kuruman, but a son of Moselekatse of much lower rank. The most influential induna — Umbate by name — was of this opinion. Lobengula, the son next in rank to Kuruman, was then in view among those who were of the same mind, though the ceremonies that would settle the chieftainship still belonged to the calendars that followed. He died in this year, when his son Lobengula was later to occupy his great place. November mattered because Pretoria learned that the Matabele chief was dead, and because Umbate already favoured Lobengula against a man from Natal who claimed to be Kuruman. [3] [4]
The Barolong clan under Montsiwa had been left in 1854 in the country of the Bangwaketsi, north of the Molopo, though the location south of that river, assigned to them by officers of the Republic in December 1851, was still regarded as theirs. Montsiwa remained with the Bangwaketsi, and his reserve, being almost unoccupied, attracted the attention of a few farmers. These settled at some of the best springs, where for several years they were undisturbed. At length Montsiwa addressed Pretorius upon the subject, and as no steps were taken to remove the farmers, on the 15th of August a letter was written in his name by the reverend Joseph Ludorf to the president and the members of the volksraad, which was the commencement of a long and acrimonious controversy. In this letter the right of the Barolong to the country occupied by their ancestors in the time of the chief Tao was made to rest upon an alliance alleged to have been entered into by Commandant-General Hendrik Potgieter in 1837 with Tawane and Moroko. On the 28th of August, a few days after the letter to the authorities of the South African Republic was written, one was addressed in the name of Montsiwa to Wodehouse, asking for protection. This was the beginning of the intercourse between the Tsili branch of the Barolong and the high commissioner on that claim. Towards the close of the year an arrangement was made for a conference between a commission from the Republic and the Batlapin and Korana chiefs, with the object of discussing and arranging matters in which they were all interested. The sitting itself belonged to the next calendar. August mattered because Ludorf’s letter of the 15th opened Montsiwa’s claim on Potgieter’s alleged alliance of 1837, and because the letter of the 28th asked Wodehouse to protect a Barolong clan whose reserve south of the Molopo farmers had taken. [3]